1. Changes in brand positioning and consistency.
2. A 50 percent tax increase implemented by the Puerto Rican government with discriminatory provisions in favor of the local competitor.
3. A change in the competitive landscape (and ultimately a repositioning of the Coors brand).
Positioning inconsistency
A key element of Coors' Light's original success in Puerto Rico was its unique and crystal-clear positioning: the product seized share because it connected with a specific demographic -young, successful people. The original positioning statement:
Coors Light is a brand which uniquely reflects/complements the needs (differentiating, refreshing, and drinkable) and desires (upscale, successful, and social) of a younger, more active and successful generation of beer drinkers. A true beer taste for a contemporary lifestyle! Over time, as the brand became more successful [2] , Coors corporate management began asserting increasing levels of control and responsibility for the brand's communication efforts. More managers were added to the local Coors office and oversight from Coors' international management increased. The result was twofold:
1. Parallel roles between the distributor, V. Suá rez, and Coors led to increasing friction and bureaucracy.
2. The brands previously clear/crisp lifestyle positioning began to erode, as successive new managers attempted to meddle with the message.
Positioning drift worsened in 2000 as international brand managers dictated that the brand focus on a particular attribute -''baja suave,'' smooth or easily drinkable. V. Suá rez management contended that this shift was unnecessary and risked disrupting the core message. Nonetheless, the shift was implemented. By 2002, in the face of softening demand, the positioning was modified, yet again, to:
Coors Light allows the target (the consumer) to stay active/socially active and keep the fun going and going because of its unique drinkable characteristics.
''Keeping the fun going'' . . . and ''unique drinkable characteristics'' were difficult values and attributes to communicate. Suá rez management felt that core emotional elements that the brand was built upon -young, upscale, active and urban -got lost in this new, vaguer positioning. Moreover, the new positioning did little to differentiate the brand from competitive products, or add the multi-dimensional texture necessary to capture consumer's interest and bond them to the brand.
Coors Light's image and identity elements began to diverge and the franchise began displaying clear signs of deterioration.
As Exhibit 1 shows, between 2000 and 2002 the brand lost over 100,000 casual and core consumers [3] . Its share of consumers declined from 64 percent to 57 percent, and performance within key demographic segments fell even further:
B urban consumer penetration fell from 65 percent to 54 percent;
B high income consumer penetration fell from 67 percent to 59 percent; and B the essential young 18-24 age group declined from 69 percent to 53 percent.
'' After having grown spectacularly for ten years, the Coors Light brand had suddenly hit a slump. Though it was still market leader it was losing share and momentum. ''
By the end of 2001, following additional management turnover, a new Coors team arrived in Puerto Rico, which included a general manager and marketing manager, neither of whom had local or beer market experience [4] . After a lengthy review and agreement to correct the drift and re-establish a revised positioning more in-line with the original positioning, the Coors/Suá rez team agreed on this:
Coors light is a premium beer for young (at heart), active, and aspirationally motivated consumers that uniquely reflects/complements socially active lifestyles and enhances social enjoyment by delivering refreshingly smooth drink-ability.
The advertising account was put out for review to six agencies -a process that took over a year. In the end, the account was renewed with the same agency, but during the review period many core programs were abandoned. Key partners grew increasingly frustrated with the mounting bureaucracy and slow response from new brand managers.
As the Coors management team struggled to understand the brand and subtleties of crafting an effective communications platform for the Puerto Rican market, they began to borrow material for commercials from the US. Dubbed US ads and Rocky Mountain imagery were adopted [5] , undermining not only the revised positioning and recently-launched communications program, but also the brand identity within the distinctive Puerto Rican culture.
The tax increase
In 2002 the Puerto Rican government found itself with growing structural deficits and an inability to meet promised raises to public employees [6] . Despite the fact that PR was already paying roughly two times more tax on alcoholic beverages than the highest taxed state in the US [7] , expediency dictated that sin taxes be raised to solve current budgetary issues. In June 2002, the Government passed a 50 percent increase in beer taxes and additional increases on wine, spirits, cigarettes and SUVs.
This was the second time in little more than a decade that a tax increase dealt a blow to the industry. A 1990 tax increase of 50 percent depressed market volume by 7.5 percentconsumption sank from a peak of 72 million gallons in 1988 to 66 million gallons in 2001. The tax of 2002 would prove to be equally damaging.
Of even more concern to V. Suá rez than the threat of a tax increase was the insertion of a provision in the tax bill that exempted the local competitor from the increase. Although a 55 cent per gallon tax differential between local players and imported players already existed, Exhibit 1 Coors Light historical consumer base by type passage of this provision would expand the tax differential to $1.90 per gallon. Worse yet, the Puerto Rican government and nationalistic interests had structured the tax to maintain the tax exemption for the local brewery until it produced more than 31 million gallons [8] , or 50 percent of the market! Despite vigorous lobbying by V. Suá rez and the rest of the industry, the bill was poised to pass. In a last ditch effort to derail it, the Coors Brewing Company convinced Senator Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado to attach a provision to a bill in Congress that would have stripped Puerto Rico of the rum tax rebate it received from the US government [9] . In retaliation, the governor and government of Puerto Rico created a public relations nightmare for Coors Brewing Company (and V. Suá rez by association) by publicly accusing them of threatening public funds earmarked to support the ''children of Puerto Rico.'' Knowing how much damage this media war could do the Coors brand, V. Suá rez Chairman Diego Suá rez sent a letter to Coors Chairman Peter Coors warning of the political, cultural and business insensitivity of this approach. Ultimately, Senator Nighthorse's amendment was withdrawn. Nonetheless, significant damage was done and an emboldened administration passed the tax bill, as drafted.
As a consequence of the tax and the expanded tax differential between the local beer and imports, retailers re-established a three-tier pricing system [10] . In the ''on-premise market,'' composed of small bars and restaurants, the new pricing structure became $1 for a local beer, $1.25 for a US import and $1.50 for a foreign import. In the ''retail'' side of the business the differential between local and US imported products expanded to over $1.25 per six-pack, a 40 percent premium, or more than $5 per case.
The ''unintentional'' repositioning of the brand
The three-tier pricing system re-positioned Coors Light to a difficult middle ground. Rather than getting Coors at the same price as the local brand, consumers would now to pay a 25 to 40 percent premium for it [11] . With the Coors Light marketing program in disarray, the stage was set for increasing customer defection. The brand was floundering like a wounded fish in the sea. Both old and new competitors circled, all eager to take a bite.
Coors Light's original and evolving positioning during the first ten years is displayed in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2 Coors Light's original and evolving positioning during the first ten years Though many competitors had attempted to imitate Coors' lifestyle positioning during the 1990s all failed to gain consumer acceptance. But as the brand and its positioning wavered, both current participants, like Medalla and Heineken, as well as a new wave of participants entered and began to carve out key positioning elements, attributes and associations:
B Corona became the young, upscale, yet laid-back and drinkable brand with strong associations with the beach and sun.
B Michelob Ultra carved out very powerful active, healthful, light and fashionable imagery.
B Heineken reinforced its upscale, sophisticated imagery but also sought the young, 18-24 age segment. While the re-establishment of the three-tier pricing system and discriminatory provisions of the 2002 tax implementation have played a significant role in the sales decline, the continuing deterioration of Coors Light's positioning and imagery are equally to blame. With imagery declines and consumer defection occurring as early as 2000, it was clear that rapid and effective remedial action would be necessary.
In 2007 Coors Light must fundamentally reassess its positioning and relevance in the Puerto Rican market. Only two potential avenues exist:
1. Rebuilding and reclaiming its original key imagery elements in a significantly more powerful and persuasive manner.
Crafting an entirely new positioning within this new competitive environment.
Both present significant challenges. But the risk of doing neither is to cede the market so arduously won over the previous ten years.
What will become of Coors Light in Puerto Rico?
While the final chapter has yet to be written, history has shown that it is extremely difficult for brands to recover from serious share declines and consumer defection. In Puerto Rico, Schaefer beer was displaced by Budweiser in the 1980s and Budweiser by Coors in the 1990s. Though the cycles are becoming shorter, in each case these brands neglected to adhere to the essential tenets of segmentation and differentiation that allowed them to displace the leaders. Each then failed to anticipate changing market dynamics, to nurture their equity and positioning, to maintain relevance to current consumers, and to attract the next generation of beer drinkers. While Coors 38-40 percent market share provides significant market power, and it retains overall leadership, time for resurgence is running short.
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Lessons learned
The lesson gleaned from Coors Light's initial ten year success was that local market knowledge, positioning and consistency are key to a product's success. The lesson from the past six years is similar: failure to understand and respect local market dynamics and to protect and proactively nurture established positioning can bring unintended consequences, quickly. As this case shows:
B Internal brand management systems permitted frequent modifications of core positioning, undermining brand perception and performance. This was exacerbated by high levels of management turnover and the absence of an effective knowledge transfer process.
B Management failed to act proactively to safeguard the brand, despite ample warning signs and failed to respond swiftly and dramatically to a structural shift (the tax burden) that accelerated dynamic shifts in the landscape.
B The team ignored the critical importance of preserving the brand's core local identity: the values, complexities, competitive context; it also failed to leverage the local partner's knowledge and experience.
Advice to managers in any market
Market share is hard to gain, easy to lose. Adherence to the following principles can help gain and protect share:
B Control brand architecture. Brand and product managers often fail to realize exactly how important, and fragile, positioning and communications are to brand success. Even subtle changes can reverberate through a brand, alienating or polarizing key consumer groups. Successful consumer product companies maintain strict controls over brand architecture to avoid unintended deviations.
B Maintain consistency. Consistency is the foundation of brand success and longevity. Whether in positioning, packaging, communications, support or approach, consumers embrace consistency like an old friend. When these brand elements change unexpectedly, and frequently, consumer anxiety increases, trust and familiarity decline, and eventually they seek new brand ''friends'' that exhibit less erratic behavior.
B Implement and maintain a brand knowledge bank. With increasing management turnover it's important to ensure that critical brand knowledge and the lessons learned in building the brand don't leave with employees. A knowledge bank and formal transfer process can help protect this critical asset.
B Rely on local partners. Local partners often have key insight into market dynamics, consumer behavior and cultural sensitivities. Shrewd marketers exploit this insight to enhance positioning and brand relevance, increase communications effectiveness and boost efficiency. It is this realization that led to the shift from global marketing to ''Glocal marketing'' [14] . They think globally but implement locally. Even consumer product titans, like Coke and Cadbury, while maintaining a global brand images, utilize different formulas to appeal to local tastes and adapt their marketing approaches to increase local relevance [15] .
'' Internal brand management systems permitted frequent modifications of core positioning, undermining brand perception and performance. This was exacerbated by high levels of management turnover and the absence of an effective knowledge transfer process. ''
How Coors Light's local strategy beat the international goliaths
The saga of the of Coors Light beer in Puerto Rico starts in the aftermath of a earlier local marketing battle in the early 1980s that pitted Budweiser, a global Goliath, against Schaefer, distributed by V. Suárez & Company. Schaefer was Puerto Rico's most popular beer until Budweiser's aggressive marketing campaign successfully dislodged Schaefer from its leadership position. By 1991, Bud had seized 50 percent of the market, while the Schaefer market share had plunged to just 16 percent. Heineken and the locally produced, Medalla, held a significant share of the remaining market (Exhibit 5).
With the Schaefer brand in decline, Diego Suá rez, CEO of V. Suá rez Company, a 45-year-old family-owned distribution company, would needed fresh challenger and a new approach if he were to attempt a rematch with Budweiser. A V. Suá rez business assessment that studied the beer wars of the 1980s revealed a way to exploit the global approach of his competitor.
For this second battle, Diego Suá rez decided to bet his marketing dollars on Coors Light, brewed in Colorado and almost unknown in Puerto Rico. The Coors brand seemed an unlikely contender to satisfy the thirsts of island consumers, given the strongly entrenched position of existing brands and the tastes of the Puerto Rico market. The company's Coors Light product was even a less likely candidate for a highly machismo Latin culture. In fact, there had never been a successful light-beer entrant to the Puerto Rican market. Bud Light and Miller Lite (the leader in the US market for light beer at the time) had both failed in their attempts to cultivate a position in the Puerto Rico. Even the local product, Medalla, had faltered when originally positioned as a light beer.
The Suá rez strategy for introducing Coors Light to the island's consumers had four parts:
1. Market segmentation. Careful planning and market research to focus on a specific customer group instead of the market as a whole.
2.
Repositioning. Designing a lifestyle-marketing program that catered to the needs of young, upscale, urban, educated consumers using ad slogans such as el cuerpo te la piede -your body craves it. The advertising and promotion campaign included strong emphasis on special events and direct marketing to the consumer.
3. Distribution dominance: Expanded distribution to assure the consumer of total access -both in city and country, and in hotels, restaurants, bars, and military bases.
4. Implementation consistency. Continuity and consistency; frequent adjustments, but no deviation from the core strategy.
In late 1990, having been assigned the distribution rights, Suá rez prepared for Coors' eventual arrival. Plans addressed every dimension of the launch, from warehousing expansion and route restructuring to incremental resource allocation in sales, marketing, and logistics. No strategic or functional area was excluded from the systematic planning to ensure that the right resources and systems would be in place when the time came to execute.
Additional research bolstered Suá rez's faith and commitment to the brand; it identified four distinct opportunities to establish Coors Light in the market:
B Trendsetter differentiation. Young, educated, affluent and urban consumers had no product options that would allow them to differentiate themselves from current Bud consumers.
B Bud positioning. Bud was the only US import serving the 18-34, medium/high-income segment. However, Bud had become ''everybody's beer'', broadening its positioning, losing focus, and abandoning the segmentation tools that had allowed it to capture its leadership position from Schaefer.
B Medalla positioning. Medalla's growth had been spurred through the defection of Bud drinkers. Additionally, Medalla had closed the pricing and price-value gap between local products and US imports [16] . Medalla was extremely vulnerable and overextended.
B Heineken decline. Super-premium pricing and declining marketing support provided additional expansion opportunity for US imports.
The Suá rez organization began to position the brand to take advantage of these distinct opportunities and endear the brand to the tastes of Puerto Rican consumers. Based on its over 45 years experience in tailoring brands to Puerto Rican needs, it was clear to the Suá rez organization that merely adopting Coors' current US positioning would result in failure. The Suá rez team also decided on a distinct lifestyle strategy [17] :
B Position Coors Light directly against Medalla and Budweiser as a high-quality, upscale, premium American beer. Continued B Promote demand for the brand as part of a contemporary lifestyle, downplaying the traditional ''light beer'' associations within the Puerto Rico market and among medium-to-heavy drinkers.
B Utilize psychographics and active lifestyle portrayal to evoke and build brand association. Build upon its overall positioning and American heritage to achieve perceived quality and status greater than Medalla, Budweiser, and other competitive products.
The promotional plans incorporated several pioneering efforts within the market including:
B Unique, upscale and entertaining programs specifically tailored for individual channels -bars, restaurant, nightclubs, road bars.
B Promotional activities that included a musical tour to introduce the brand to Puerto Rico, international volleyball tournaments, and special activities associated with the target market.
B A unique members club designed to convert brand adopters into active brand ambassadors [18] .
Implementation consistency
After launching the brand in mid-1991, V. Suá rez held steadfast to its original strategy and positioning and increased support for the brand. Though the initial programs were modified to respond to market, demographic and competitive changes, the fundamental strategy had not changed up until 2000.
Performance
The launch in the first year produced market penetration of 13.5 percent, 2.2 percentage points above the 11.3 percent projected in the original Suá rez plan but 50 percent higher than the Coors Light's share in the US.
By 2001 Coors Light commanded a market share in Puerto Rico of over 56 percent (six times greater than in the US) Puerto Rico had become the largest market in the world for Coors Light outside of the US, and V. Suá rez was the largest Coors distributor in the world, selling 20 million cases annually (see Exhibit 6).
The initial lessons from this success highlighted the impact that local market knowledge and positioning can have on a product's success. Nimble local or regional players may dethrone even the largest of multi-national or global competitors who often fail to recognize or embrace cultural differences and unique market conditions.
But as times changes, rivals revive and re-attack, and sometimes marketers lose focus. As early as 2000, there were hints that the Coors Light reign was imperiled. This new case covers the period from 2001 to the present and it details the downfall from dominance.
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